As far as competition law is concerned, such cartels may be regarded as infringements `similar to allegations` and are considered anti-competitive, whether or not they have genuinely anti-competitive effects. In theory, such trade could still be justified under Article 101(3), but it is unlikely that it will be exempted, as it is generally linked to price or quantity fixing cartels. Horizontal cooperation agreements (“cooperation agreements”) are agreements concluded between actual or potential competitors operating on the market at the same level of production or distribution. There are six general categories of cooperation agreements, including research and development (R&D); production; purchases; marketing; standardization, industry standards; and exchange of information (“IE”). Where production is carried out jointly by two or more parties, it may be carried out either through a joint venture (i.e. a jointly controlled undertaking) or through more flexible cooperation, such as. B a `subcontracting agreement`, which may be horizontal or vertical. The main objective of a standardization agreement is to define the technical and qualitative requirements that can be met by current or future products, production processes, services or methods. The completion of such an assessment will depend to a large part on the market in which the parties to the agreement operate.
If the combined market share of the parties to a specialisation and production agreement exceeds 20%, several additional factors should be taken into account, including the rate of market concentration, the number of operators, the existence of barriers to entry and similar agreements on the market, as well as market dynamics in general. However, the sharing agreements have also been revised. The Commission has introduced additional flexibility by adding common user agreements with exclusive licences. This now covers a scenario in which only one party can produce and distribute the products covered by the cooperation agreement on the basis of an exclusivity licence issued by the other parties. The main competition concern at IE is where there are cartels. This will be the case if the exchange of information creates reciprocal expectations about uncertainties in the market and leads to a common understanding of the conditions for coordination, if it allows transparency in the market to monitor deviations from collusion results and retaliatory measures against new entrants. The guidelines and the beR specialisation do not constitute a radical abandonment of the existing rules on specialisation and production agreements. The changes to these types of agreements are relatively minor and are an update rather than a complete revision of the existing rules. Readers familiar with the current regulations should therefore have no difficulty in familiarizing themselves with the specialization section of the guidelines and the “specialization” BeR. The “safe haven” for the standard compliance process has been maintained in the updated chapter and identifies three situations in which the ban on EU anti-competitive agreements would not apply. In this regard, the procedure for adopting the standard is open, unlimited access to the standard and transparent; whether there is a clear and balanced policy on intellectual property acts, including the disclosure, in good faith, of essential defenders of intellectual property rights and the irrevocable obligation to grant licenses on fair and non-discriminatory terms (FRAND)..
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