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Greece: In 2011, reforms led to a decentralisation of wage negotiations; This chapter provides new information on the role of collective bargaining for good labour market performance. This assessment of collective bargaining contributed to the OECD`s new Employment Strategy (OECD, 2018[1]), which sets out three main policy objectives for the success of labour market policies: (i) more and better jobs; (ii) labour market inclusion; and (iii) resilience and adaptability. Collective bargaining has the potential to play a central role in all three areas. The chapter deals with a large number of outcomes related to good labour market performance, including employment, wages, inequality and productivity, while the role of collective bargaining on resilience has already been studied in the OECD (2017[2]). The effectiveness of the articulation of agreements at enterprise level within the framework of framework agreements that characterize organized decentralization depends to a large extent on the degree of collective representation of employees at enterprise level. The benefits of better education in the form of higher wages are less in company negotiations and even more sectoral. A reduction in the burden of payment for education can certainly be reduced, but it can also have a negative impact on productivity growth if it reduces investment in education. Finally, it is also found that the monetary reward for seniority explains why, in countries where company and industry negotiations are conducted, wage dispersion in collective bargaining is lower than in the absence, while the image is the opposite in the group of countries that have only collective bargaining at company level. Using a mix of available transnational micro and macro data and a new characterisation of collective bargaining systems based on the main elements referred to in Chapter 2, namely: This chapter highlighted the link between tariff systems and employment, wages and productivity. There was a time when collective agreements resulted in conditions so rigid that employers could not effectively address trade concerns. . . .